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Public Health vs. Public Health: Balancing 
Environmental Concerns with the Need for 
Sterile Medical Devices 
Jack Brooksbank 
In December 2016, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) upgraded the hazard level of a chemical called ethylene 
oxide (ETO) from a “probable human carcinogen” to a “human 
carcinogen.”1 Less than two years later, the EPA made public 
that it had found an elevated risk of cancer in the town of 
Willowbrook, Illinois.2 Willowbrook is a village on the outskirts 
of Chicago with a population of approximately 8500—and had 
been, for decades, the home of an industrial plant that emitted 
approximately four thousand to seven thousand pounds of ETO 
per year.3 The local reaction was swift and powerful. Citizens 
formed an advocacy group to shut down the plant.4 The state 
attorney general filed a public nuisance suit against the operator 
of the Willowbrook plant: Sterigenics, LLC.5 The Illinois 
legislature passed two laws further restricting the use of ETO.6 
Because of the new laws, the Illinois EPA overruled the 
operating permit Sterigenics needed to run the plant—
temporarily shuttering the facility.7 
 
 1. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA/635/R-16/350Fa, 
EVALUATION OF THE INHALATION CARCINOGENICITY OF ETHYLENE OXIDE 
(2016) [hereinafter EPA 2016]. 
 2. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, LETTER HEALTH CONSULTATION (2018). 
 3. ILLINOIS EPA, STERIGENICS ANNUAL EMISSION REPORT (2017). 
 4. See STOP STERIGENICS, https://www.stopsterigenics.com/ (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2020). 
 5. Complaint, People v. Sterigenics, No. 2018CH001329 (Ill. Cir. Ct 2018). 
 6. Ill. Pub. Act 101-0022, 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9.16 (2019), Ill. Pub. Act 
101-0023, 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9.16 (2019). 
 7. Press Release, Illinois EPA, Illinois EPA Director Seals Portions of 
Sterigenics Due to Public Health Hazards from Ethylene Oxide Emissions (Feb. 
15, 2019), https://www2.illinois.gov/IISNews/19717-
IEPA_Director_Seals_Portions_of_Sterigenics_Press_Release.pdf. The Illinois 
EPA issued a “seal order” which, although not technically related to the then-
current ETO release permit, prevented Sterigenics from using their ETO-based 
equipment. Id; see also 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 415/34(b) (2019) (granting the Illinois 
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The Illinois EPA eventually issued Sterigenics a new 
permit—reducing the allowable emissions at the facility from 
eighteen tons per year to just eighty-five pounds per year.8 
However, local resistance did not abate. The community 
continued to organize in opposition to the company.9 Additional, 
stricter legislation regulating the use of ETO was proposed in 
the state legislature.10 Resistance to the plant’s reopening was 
so fierce that, just ten days after the reissuance of its operating 
permit, Sterigenics announced that it was closing the 
Willowbrook plant for good.11 
While this action seemed like a clear victory for community 
organizing in some circles, in others it was ringing alarm bells. 
ETO is a clear, colorless gas that binds strongly to DNA 
molecules, but does not interact with most metals or plastics.12 
At close to room temperature13 and in the absence of moisture or 
 
EPA the authority to close facilities or seal equipment if the agency finds 
“emergency conditions” exist). 
 8. ILLINOIS EPA, ID 043110AAC, Construction Permit, NESHAP Source 
(Sept. 20, 2019). 
 9. See, e.g., Ted Cox, Stop Sterigenics Rips IEPA ETO Permit, ONE 
ILLINOIS (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.oneillinois.com/stories/2019/9/23/stop-
sterigenics-rips-iepa-permit-on-eto. 
 10. ILH.B. 3888, 101st Ill. Gen. Assembly (2019) (documenting reaction of 
citizen group). 
 11. Michael Hawthorne, Sterigenics Is Leaving Willowbrook, Eliminating 
Key Source of Cancer-Causing Ethylene Oxide in Chicago’s Western Suburbs, 




 12. ALICE N. PARISI & WILLIAM E. YOUNG, Sterilization with Ethylene 
Oxide and Other Gases, in DISINFECTION, STERILIZATION, AND PRESERVATION, 
580–95 (Seymour S. Block ed., 1991). 
 13. Most ETO sterilization takes place slightly above room temperature, 
between about forty and sixty degrees Celsius. GAMMA INDUSTRY PROCESSING 
ALLIANCE, A Comparison of Gamma, E-beam, X-ray and Ethylene Oxide 
Technologies for the Industrial Sterilization of Medical Devices and Healthcare 
Products 29 (2017), [hereinafter GAMMA INDUSTRY PROCESSING ALLIANCE], 
http://iiaglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/White-Paper-Comparison-
Gamma-Eb-Xray-and-EO-for-Sterilisation.pdf. Steam sterilization, on the other 
hand, generally requires elevating the temperature to over 120 degrees Celsius. 
William A. Rutala, David J. Weber, & Healthcare Infection Control Practices 
Advisory Committee, Guideline for Disinfection and Sterilization in Healthcare 
Facilities (2008) 59–60, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (last 
updated May 2019). 
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radiation,14 ETO is the most widely used sterilizing agent for 
medical devices in the country.15 Indeed, for many types of 
medical devices, ETO is the only sterilization method currently 
available.16 That is what Sterigenics performed at Willowbrook: 
it sterilized thousands of medical devices per day, from knee 
implants and pacemakers to syringes and surgical kits.17 
Sterile medical devices are essential to the functioning of 
the American healthcare system, and access to sterile medical 
devices saves untold lives.18 But there is not a great deal of 
excess sterilization capacity. Almost immediately upon closure 
of the plant, private industry groups and the federal government 
sounded the alarm about possible device shortages due to the 
closing of the Willowbrook plant.19 
What could the federal government do in this situation? 
Indeed, which part of the federal government would act? The 
FDA seems like the obvious choice given the nature of the 
problem. But it was changes in environmental law that led to 
the Willowbrook plant closimg in the first place, indicating that 
perhaps the EPA should be responsible. Given the complex and 
overlapping web of federal regulations, if the federal government 
decides to get involved, it is not clear which agency should act. 
 
 14. Norman E. Sharpless, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, STATEMENT 
ON CONCERNS WITH MEDICAL DEVICE AVAILABILITY DUE TO CERTAIN 
STERILIZATION FACILITY CLOSURES (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-
events/press-announcements/statement-concerns-medical-device-availability-
due-certain-sterilization-facility-closures. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. FAQs, STERIGENICS, INC., 
https://www.sterigenicswillowbrook.com/faqs (last visited Feb 2, 2020). 
     18. Pre-sterilization surgeries had a mortality rate of up to forty-five pe-
cent, and even rudimentary sterilization cut that rate to approximately fifteen 
percent. Ulrich Tröhler, Statistics and the British controversy about the effects 
of Joseph Lister’s system of antisepsis for surgery, 1867–1890, 108 J. R. SOC. 
MED. 280 (2015). Modern surgery has an overall mortality rate of around 0.71 
percent. Anna Heeney et al., Surgical Mortality - an Analysis of All Deaths 
Within a General Surgical Department 12 SURGEON 121 (2014). Given that 
there were more than forty-eight million surgical procedures performed in the 
United States in 2010 alone, Margaret J. Hall et al., NATIONAL CENTER FOR 
HEALTH STATISTICS, AMBULATORY SURGERY DATA FROM HOSPITALS AND AM-
BULATORY SURGERY CENTERS: UNITED STATES, 2010 (February 28, 2017), and 
sterile medical devices are used for many procedures outside of surgery, the 
number of lives saved by sterilization is enormous.  
 19. See, e.g., Sharpless, supra note 14. 
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And even if an agency decides to attempt to intervene, it is not 
clear what they could actually do. 
This Note attempts to determine whether any federal 
agencies could intervene to preempt state regulations of ETO. 
Part I of this Note introduces the relevant background 
information and the various regulatory schemes for ETO use and 
describes the general rules of how each statute handles 
preemption. Part II then analyzes whether the specific state 
regulations restricting the use of ETO for sterilizing medical 
devices are preempted under current federal law. This Note 
concludes that the balkanization of agency regulation prohibits 
agencies from making broad risk-risk balancing decisions 
outside their explicit mandate. Agencies should be given this 
power to prevent actions taken in one context from spilling over 
into another and causing serious consequences. The Clean Air 
Act should be amended, restricting the ability of states to pass 
regulations absent a preemption waiver from the EPA. This 
waiver should then generally be freely given—leaving the 
balance of state and federal power practically unchanged, unless 
and until the EPA finds that state action is endangering the 
public health. 
I. BACKGROUND 
ETO is the most common sterilizing agent for medical 
devices due to its structure and specific reactivity.20 However, 
those same properties mean that working with ETO is extremely 
dangerous.21 While the effects of long-term ETO exposure are 
not well understood, scientists have long known that ETO is 
highly toxic—and scientific understanding of the long-term 
effects of exposure is growing more robust. Because of the high 
toxicity of ETO, it has long been regulated under a variety of 
federal statutes, each of which preempts state law to varying 
degrees. 
 
 20. GAMMA INDUSTRY PROCESSING ALLIANCE, supra note 13 at 28. 
 21. Dennis W. Lynch et al., Carcinogenic and Toxicologic Effects of Inhaled 
Ethylene Oxide and Propylene Oxide in F344 Rats, 76 TOXICOLOGY AND APPLIED 
PHARMACOLOGY 69 (1984) (documenting the carcinogenic effects of ETO). 
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A. ETO IS THE MOST WIDELY USED STERILANT FOR MEDICAL 
DEVICES 
ETO is currently the most common method used to sterilize 
medical devices before use.22 Currently, just over half of all 
medical devices in America are sterilized using ETO23—a total 
of approximately 20 billion individual devices per year.24 Devices 
sterilized using ETO range from complex devices such as 
pacemakers25 to simpler objects that many people may not even 
think of as medical devices, such as wound dressings.26 
ETO is a small, volatile molecule with the chemical formula 
C2H4O.27 At room temperature, ETO is a colorless gas.28 The two 
carbon atoms and the oxygen atom form a three-member ring, 
making ETO a member of a class of compounds called epoxides.29 
Due to the inherent instability of such a small chemical ring, 
epoxides are known for being highly reactive.30 ETO is no 
exception. ETO degrades quickly when dissolved in water, 
having a half-life of just twelve to fourteen days.31 High 
concentration skin exposure to ETO may result in chemical 
 
 22. GAMMA INDUSTRY PROCESSING ALLIANCE, supra note 13 at 28. 
 23. Sharpless, supra note 14. 
 24. Medline, Inc., Facts About Ethylene Oxide, Medical Sterilization and 
Medline, https://newsroom.medline.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/EO-One-
Pager.FINAL_-1.pdf. 
 25. Thomas C. Crawford et al., Cleaning and Sterilization of Used Cardiac 
Implantable Electronic Devices with Process Validation, 3 J. AM. COLLEGE OF 
CARDIOLOGY: CLINICAL ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 623, 626 (June 2017). 
 26. Ethylene Oxide Sterilization for Medical Devices, FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION, https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/general-hospital 
-devices-and-supplies/ethylene-oxide-sterilization-medical-devices#what (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2020) [hereinafter Ethylene Oxide Sterilization for Medical 
Devices]. 
 27. PUBCHEM, Ethylene Oxide, 
https://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/compound/Ethylene-oxide#section=NIOSH-
Analytical-Methods (last visited Feb. 1, 2020). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Kathleen M. Morgan et al., Thermochemical Studies of Epoxides and 
Related Compounds, 78 J. ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 4303, 4303 (2013) (noting that 
epoxides “react readily”). 
 31. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA/600/8-84-009F, HEALTH 
ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT FOR ETHYLENE OXIDE at 1-1 (1985) [hereinafter EPA 
1985]. Indeed, the reactivity of ETO means it can be controlled relatively easily: 
simply passing the used gas through acidified water causes it to break down 
into less volatile compounds. See CR CLEAN AIR GROUP, Ethylene Oxide, 
https://www.crcleanair.com/pollutants/ethylene-oxide/ (last visited Jan. 31, 
2020) [hereinafter CR CLEAN AIR GROUP]. 
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burns.32 In addition, it is highly flammable and potentially 
explosive.33 
Despite the hazards, ETO is widely recommended as a 
sterilizing agent for medical devices.34 This is due in part to the 
mechanism by which ETO sterilization works. The most common 
sterilization methods other than ETO are heat/steam- or 
radiation-based.35 These methods are effective at killing 
microorganisms, but are often so harsh that they would destroy 
the device itself during sterilization.36 ETO, on the other hand, 
functions by reacting with DNA molecules, disrupting the 
genome of any microorganisms present.37 This allows device 
sterilization to proceed at near room temperature, and in the 
absence of moisture or radiation. ETO can therefore be used to 
sterilize devices that irradiation or heat treatment would 
damage. Indeed, for many types of devices, ETO is the only 
currently available sterilization method.38 
B. THERE ARE CONCERNS OVER THE LONG-TERM TOXICITY OF 
ETO 
In addition to being highly flammable, and acutely toxic in 
high concentrations, scientists and regulators have long 
expressed concerns over the health effects of long-term exposure 
to ETO.39 After all, the chemical is widely used in the 
sterilization industry precisely because of its harmful effects on 
DNA. Studies performed on animals demonstrate that ETO has 
 
 32. See PUBCHEM, supra note 27. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Rutala et al., supra note 13. 
 35. See GAMMA INDUSTRY PROCESSING ALLIANCE, supra note 13, at 8. 
 36. For example, many devices contain electronics that are moisture-
sensitive. Irradiation also causes degradation in many of the types of polymers 
and plastics used in medical device manufacturing. See GAMMA INDUSTRY 
PROCESSING ALLIANCE, supra note 13, at 28. 
 37. PARISI & YOUNG, supra note 12. 
 38. Suzanne B. Schwartz & Elizabeth F. Claverie-Williams, Preventing 
Medical Device Shortages by Ensuring Safe and Effective Sterilization in 




 39. See, e.g., EPA 1985, supra note 31, at 1-3–1-8. 
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significant long-term carcinogenic effects.40 However, scientific 
inquiries into the long-term effects of ETO exposure in humans 
have long been plagued with a paucity of data, making it difficult 
for researchers to draw strong conclusions.41 This is due in large 
part to the obvious ethical problems of conducting direct human 
studies.42 In 1985, EPA conducted a review of the effects of ETO 
exposure.43 The agency concluded that ETO was a “probable 
human carcinogen.”44 However, the agency stressed that its 
conclusion was based largely on a lack of quality data.45 
Beginning in 2011, EPA undertook a second look at the 
toxicity of ETO as part of its Integrated Risk Information System 
(IRIS) process.46 This reexamination was significantly more 
rigorous than the 1985 initial review due to the existence of 
additional studies on the effects of ETO performed after 1985. 
These included a number of additional animal studies.47 The 
most important new data sources, however, were 
epidemiological studies linking ETO exposure to several forms 
of cancer in workers regularly exposed to ETO.48 Additionally, 
the reevaluation used more complete guidelines for assessing the 
toxicity of chemicals, developed by the EPA in 2005.49 As a result 
 
 40. See, e.g., Lynch et al., supra note 21; H. Dunkelberg, Carcinogenicity of 
Ethylene Oxide and 1,2-Propylene Oxide upon Intragastric Administration to 
Rats, 46 BRITISH J. CANCER 924 (1982). 
 41. Cf. R. E. Shore, M. J. Gardner, & B. Pannett, Ethylene Oxide: An 
Assessment of the Epidemiological Evidence on Carcinogenicity, 50 
OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVTL. MED. 971 (1993) (failing to find a statistically 
significant relationship between occupational exposure to ETO and incidences 
of cancer). 
 42. EPA 1985, supra note 31, at 1-7. 
 43. See generally id. 
 44. Id. at 1-7. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See EPA 2016, supra note 1. IRIS is a comprehensive risk assessment 
program run by the EPA to evaluate the risk posed by environmental 
contaminants. Basic Information About the Integrated Risk Information 
System, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/iris/basic-
information-about-integrated-risk-information-system (last visited Jan. 31, 
2020). IRIS studies are multistep affairs, including research of scientific 
literature, review by the EPA and other agencies, peer review by scientists, and 
the submission of public comments. Id. (navigate to the “IRIS Process” tab). 
 47. EPA 2016, supra note 1, at 3-20. 
 48. Id. at 3-14–3-19. 
 49. EPA, EPA/630/P-03/001F, GUIDELINES FOR CARCINOGEN RISK 
ASSESSMENT (2005) [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR CARCINOGEN RISK 
ASSESSMENT]. 
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of the reevaluation, the final report—published in 2016—
upgraded the toxicity of ETO from “probable human carcinogen” 
to “human carcinogen.”50 While this classification is solely 
informational, and alters no legal requirements,51 the upgraded 
threat level brought more attention to the use of ETO. This 
prompted further investigation into the effects of ETO release, 
resulting in the findings of increased cancer risk that motivated 
state lawmakers to further restrict the use of ETO.52 
C. THE FEDERAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR ETO DIVIDES 
AUTHORITY BETWEEN DIFFERENT AGENCIES AND STATUTES 
Due to its high toxicity and widespread use, the federal 
government has strictly regulated ETO since at least 1990.53 
However, there is no clear central regulatory scheme for the 
chemical. Rather, ETO is regulated on a “per context” basis. 
Thus at the federal level ETO is governed by at least two 
separate agencies under at least three separate statutes: the 
EPA under the Clean Air Act54 (CAA); the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act55 (FIFRA); and the FDA under 
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act56 (FDCA).57 Each of these 
statutes, and the accompanying regulations, deals with ETO use 
in different contexts. 
i. Regulation by the EPA Under the Clean Air Act 
In 1990, Congress, unhappy with what it perceived as a lack 
of effective agency action to regulate air pollutants, substantially 
 
 50. See EPA 2016, supra note 1, at 1-1. 
 51. GUIDELINES FOR CARCINOGEN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 49, at 1-
2. 
 52. See AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, supra 
note 2 (stating that the EPA reexamined the health impact of the Willowbrook 
Sterigenics plant in part due to the increase in the threat assessment of ETO). 
 53. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101–549, Nov. 15, 1990, 
104 Stat. 2399. 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2018) et seq. 
 55. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2018) et seq. 
 56. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2018) et seq. 
 57. ETO is also governed by myriad state and local regulations. For 
example, the CAA allows delegation of a great deal of authority to state actors. 
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2018). This Note focuses on the boundaries of federal 
legal authority and regulations. As such, more detail concerning the exact 
details of state’s laws falls beyond the scope. 
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amended the CAA.58 These amendments increased the power of 
the EPA to regulate hazardous air pollutants,59 and additionally 
set a schedule requiring the EPA to take action to regulate 
hazardous air pollutants.60 
Congress set two methods for determining whether a given 
chemical is a “hazardous air pollutant” (HAP). First, a chemical 
could be listed directly in the statute.61 Second, chemicals can be 
designated as a HAP if the EPA finds that the chemical creates 
a “human health hazard”62 or would have “adverse 
environmental effects.”63 If the EPA finds that a chemical meets 
either of those criteria, the EPA may designate it as a HAP 
through the rulemaking process.64 ETO is one of the chemicals 
listed within the statute itself.65 
Once a chemical is designated as a HAP, the EPA 
regulations list all of the categories of “major sources” or “area 
sources” of that pollutant.66 Once a source category is listed, the 
agency must promulgate a National Emission Standard for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) for that category.67 Setting 
a NESHAP is a two-step technology-based process: first the EPA 
sets a regulatory “floor” determined by the best control 
technology currently in use, and then it considers whether an 
 
 58. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub.L. 101–549, Nov. 15, 1990, 104 
Stat. 2399. 
 59. Id. § 301 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2018)). 
 60. Id. (amending 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(2), (e) 1990)). 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (2018). 189 specific chemicals were included 
within the statute. Id. 
 62. “Human health hazards” include substances “known to be, or may 
reasonably be anticipated to be, carcinogenic, mutagenic, teratogenic, 
neurotoxic, which cause[s] reproductive dysfunction, or which [are] acutely or 
chronically toxic.” Id. § 7412(b)(2). 
 63. “Adverse environmental effects” is less well-defined, but specifically 
mentions effects such as bioaccumulation. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. § 7412(b)(1). 
 66. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1). A “major source” is a source that “has the 
potential” to emit ten or more tons of a single HAP, or twenty-five or more tons 
of any combination of HAPs. Id. § 7412(a)(1). Therefore a plant that, operating 
at full capacity, would release more than ten tons of a given HAP is a major 
source—regardless of whether it was, in fact, ever operated at full capacity. An 
“area source” is any stationary source that is not a “major source.” Id. § 
7412(a)(2). 
 67. Id. § 7412(c)(2). 
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even higher degree of control would be feasible.68 NESHAPs 
must be set at a level the agency determines to be the “maximum 
degree of reduction in emissions . . . achievable[,]” taking into 
account the costs of achieving such reductions and “any non-air 
quality health and environmental impacts.”69 The CAA also sets 
minimum requirements for the stringency of these standards. 
For example, the standard for new emission sources (that is, 
sources constructed after the passage of the statute) must “not 
be less stringent than the emission control that is achieved in 
practice by the best controlled similar source.”70 
The EPA completed this process for ETO in 1994.71 It 
designated “sterilization facilities” as a category of pollution 
source and set a NESHAP for ETO release from those facilities.72 
However, although the EPA sets minimum standards for 
HAPs, state actors are the primary enforcers of the CAA. The 
CAA invites states to submit a proposed State Implementation 
Plan (SIP).73 These plans detail, among other requirements, how 
the state’s proposed enforcement mechanisms will ensure 
compliance with CAA standards.74 The EPA then reviews the 
proposed SIP, and if the EPA is not satisfied that the SIP will 
ensure adequate pollution control, may either call for the SIP to 
be amended or reject it entirely.75 In the absence of an adequate 
SIP, enforcement authority remains with the EPA, which will 
implement its own enforcement plan.76 If satisfied, however, the 
EPA allows the SIP to go into effect, transferring primary 
 
 68. See Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 858 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2). 
 70. Id. § 7412(d)(3). 
 71. EPA, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for 
Ethylene Oxide Commercial Sterilization and Fumigation Operations, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 62585-01, 62589–601 (Dec. 6, 1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 63.360–.367). 
 72. 40 C.F.R. §§ 63.360–.368 (2019); see also 40 C.F.R. § 63.10382 (2019) 
(in-hospital sterilization). 
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1). 
 74. Id. SIPs must also contain enforceable emissions limits and technology 
standards for achieving those limits, provide for state monitoring programs to 
ensure compliance, demonstrate that local law enforcement will be adequately 
funded, require states to periodically report on emissions, detail the models the 
state is basing its decisions on, and set up a permitting process that charges 
sufficient fees to pay for itself. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(A)–(L). 
 75. Id. § 7410(k)(1)(B)–(k)(5). 
 76. Id. § 7410(c)(1). 
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enforcement authority to the state.77 The EPA still retains 
authority to independently enforce the requirements set forth in 
the SIP, even absent state action.78 Although the EPA cannot 
force a state to submit an SIP,79 states that fail to do so can be 
sanctioned, for example, by the loss of some federal highway 
funding.80 Currently, every state has submitted an SIP and been 
approved.81 This is not a one-time approval, however. If the EPA 
learns of some deficiency later on, or suspects that the state is 
not living up to the necessary standards, the EPA must call for 
the SIP to be amended to address that concern.82 Failure to 
address concerns raised by the EPA can then be grounds for 
revocation of state authority.83 The EPA has issued numerous 
 
 77. Id. § 7410(k)(3). 
 78. Id. § 7413. 
 79. “No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution 
simply does not give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate.” 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992). This “anti-
commandeering” principal forbids federal laws from requiring that a state take 
responsibility for implementing the federal CAA. See id. at 175 (stating that 
federal action that “commandeer[s]” state governments into the service of 
federal regulatory purpose is inconsistent with the “Constitution’s division of 
authority between federal and state governments”). However, Congress may 
use incentives to encourage states to cooperate with a federal program. Id. at 
166 (“Our cases have identified a variety of methods, short of outright coercion, 
by which Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative program with federal 
interests”). For example, “Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of 
federal funds.” South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987). These conditions 
may not be coercive. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 
578 (2012) (discussing that a State needs to have a legitimate choice of “whether 
to accept the federal conditions in exchange for federal funds”). But, as long as 
the conditions do not reach this threshold, Congress can still “induce the States 
to adopt policies that the Federal Government itself could not impose.” Id. at 
537 (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 205–06). 
 80. 42 U.S.C. § 7509(a) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 7410(m); see also 42 U.S.C. § 
7509(b) (detailing the allowable sanctions). 
 81. See 40 C.F.R. Part 52 (listing all current SIPs). 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5). 
 83. Id. § 7410(c)(1)(A). 
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SIP calls;84 however, such a call rarely results in full revocation 
of state authority.85 
ii. Regulation by the EPA Under FIFRA 
ETO is also regulated by the EPA as a pesticide under 
FIFRA. FIFRA defines “pesticide” as “any substance or mixture 
of substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or 
mitigating any pest.”86 “Pest” includes “any . . . fungus” and 
“any . . . virus, bacteria, or other microorganism.”87 As a 
chemical sterilant used to destroy bacteria, ETO meets the 
definition. 
FIFRA is primarily a registration-based statute. Its central 
provision is a prohibition on selling “any pesticide that is not 
registered under this [Act].”88 Applicants for registration supply 
the agency with their proposed registrations and a full copy of 
the proposed labeling.89 The registration will then be granted as 
long as the claims are supported by proper data and the labeling 
is found to be sufficient.90 However, FIFRA still contains some 
controls over how pesticides are used. In addition to labeling, an 
applicant must supply the EPA with any controls it deems 
necessary.91 The applicant supplies “any directions for its use.”92 
 
 84. See, e.g., EPA, FACT SHEET: FINAL RULE—EMISSIONS MONITORING 
PROVISIONS IN STATE IMPLEMENTATION PLANS REQUIRED UNDER THE NOX SIP 
CALL (Feb. 2019), available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-
02/documents/nox_sip_call_update_factsheet.pdf; EPA, STATE PLANS TO 
ADDRESS EMISSIONS DURING STARTUP, SHUTDOWN AND MALFUNCTION: FINAL 
ACTION ON RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR RULEMAKING, RESTATEMENT OF 
POLICY, FINDINGS OF INADEQUACY AND CALL FOR REVISIONS: FACT SHEET (May 
22, 2015), available at 
https://www3.epa.gov/airquality/urbanair/sipstatus/docs/20150522fs.pdf. 
 85. There are currently eleven Federal Implementation Plans in effect. See 
EPA, Basic Information About Air Quality FIPs, https://www.epa.gov/air-
quality-implementation-plans/basic-information-about-air-quality-fips (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2020) (listing all Federal Implementation Plans currently in 
effect). However, they are all relatively limited in scope, covering only portions 
of the CAA requirements. Id. For example, the federal government has taken 
over authority in Arkansas, but only as relating to interstate emissions of NOx. 
40 C.F.R. § 52.184 (2020). 
 86. 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (2018). 
 87. Id. § 136(t). 
 88. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2018). 
 89. Id. § 136a(c)(1). 
 90. Id. § 136a(c)(5). 
 91. Id. § 136a(c)(1)(C) & (E).  
     92. Id. 
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The EPA can also designate the chemical as a “restricted use 
pesticide.”93 This chemical may then only be used under the 
supervision of a certified pesticide applicator.94 
The EPA must also find that the chemical, when used to 
perform its “intended function . . . will not generally cause 
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.”95 In 
determining what constitutes an “unreasonable adverse effect 
on the environment,” the EPA must account for “the economic, 
social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any 
pesticide,” and must “weigh any risks of the pesticide against the 
health risks such as the diseases transmitted by the vector to be 
controlled by the pesticide.”96 
ETO is currently registered under FIFRA for several uses.97 
ETO is a general use pesticide, subject to detailed labeling 
 
 93. Id. § 136a(c)(1)(E), (d) (differentiating restricted use pesticides from 
general use pesticides, which are regulated less stringently). 
 94. Id. § 136a(d)(1)(C). 
 95. Id. § 136a(c)(5). 
 96. Id. § 136(bb). 
 97. EPA, EPA 738-R-08-003, REREGISTRATION ELIGIBILITY DECISION FOR 
ETHYLENE OXIDE (Mar. 2008), available at 
https://archive.epa.gov/pesticides/reregistration/web/pdf/ethylene-oxide-
red.pdf. 
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requirements.98 Firms using ETO for sterilization must provide 
all staff with health and safety training.99 
iii. Regulation by the FDA Under the FDCA 
The FDCA grants the FDA regulatory authority over 
medical devices. “Devices” are defined as any “instrument, 
apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro 
reagent, or other similar or related article” that is “intended for 
use in the diagnosis . . . or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or 
prevention of disease . . . which does not achieve its primary 
 
 98. ETO labeling must include a list of appropriate materials for personal 
protective equipment, directions for wearing protective equipment, directions 
for what to do if users of the chemical are directly exposed, recommendations 
for safe handling of the chemical, environmental hazards, information on what 
applications the chemical might be used for, risk mitigation steps, and a 
reference to EPA regulations governing minimum facility requirements. Id. at 
48–54. Many of these directions require that the labeling contain the exact 
words chosen by the EPA. Id. For example, all ETO containers must bear a label 
stating that “[u]sers should wash hands before eating, drinking, chewing gum, 
using tobacco, or using the toilet.” Id. at 52. The required labeling can also be 
fairly lengthy. For example, just one of the labels required to be on every ETO 
container must state the minimum level of personal protective equipment, and 
must read: 
All handlers must wear at a minimum: 
> Long-sleeved shirt and long pants, 
> Shoes plus socks, 
> Chemical-resistant gloves, and 
> when the ambient ETO concentration is 1 to 50 ppm, full-facepiece 
respirator with ETO approved canister, front or back mounted, 
> when the ambient ETO concentration is 50 to 2,000 ppm, (1) positive-pressure 
supplied-air respirator equipped with full-facepiece, hood, or 
helmet; or (2) continuous-flow supplied-air respirator (positive-pressure) 
equipped with hood, helmet, or suit, 
> when the ambient ETO concentration is >2,000 ppm or unknown (e.g., 
emergency situations), (1) positive-pressure self-contained breathing 
apparatus equipped with full-facepiece; or (2) positive-pressure full facepiece 
supplied-air respirator equipped with an auxiliary positive-pressure self-
contained breathing apparatus. 
When handlers could have eye or skin contact with ETO or ETO 
solutions, such as during maintenance and repair, vessel cleaning, or 
cleaning up spills, they must wear: 
> Chemical-resistant attire, such as an apron, protective suit, or footwear 
that protects the area of the body that might contact ETO or ETO 
solutions, and 
>Face-sealing goggles, a full face shield, or a full-face respirator. 
Id. at 49–54. 
 99. Id. at 8, 24–25. 
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intended purposes through chemical action . . . .”100 Critically for 
ETO, the definition of “device” includes finished medical devices 
as well as “any component, part, or accessory” of a finished 
device.101 As a necessary part of the final, sterile device, ETO as 
a chemical sterilant is a device “component.” Thus, while a 
layman would not generally consider gases to be a “device,” as a 
necessary component ETO meets the legal definition of “device.” 
This classification grants the the FDA the power to ban the sale 
of any devices it deems to be “adulterated.”102 One ground for 
determining that a product is adulterated is that it was 
manufactured using inadequate quality controls.103 
The FDCA does not require the FDA to set specific 
manufacturing guidelines. However, the FDA does have direct 
authority to promulgate regulations governing the 
manufacturing of medical devices,104 in addition to the 
adulteration guidelines. For the most part, the FDA relies on 
private industry standards for ETO sterilization.105 These 
“voluntary consensus standards” contain model guidelines for 
the development and validation of ETO sterilization methods.106 
The FDA has also used its rulemaking authority to set more 
specific guidelines where it feels necessary.107 
 
 100. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2018). 
 101. Id. 
 102. 21 U.S.C. § 351(a). 
 103. Id. 
 104. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(f) (2018). 
 105. See Ethylene Oxide Sterilization for Medical Devices, supra note 26 
(“Two voluntary consensus standards . . . describe how to develop, validate, and 
control ethylene oxide sterilization processes.”). The two standards are ANSI 
AAMI ISO 11135 (2014) and ANSI AAMI ISO 10993-7:2008(R) (2012). Id. See 




rom=&effectivedateto=&pagenum=10&sortcolumn=pdd (listing recognized 
consensus standards for sterility). 
 106. Ethylene Oxide Sterilization for Medical Devices, supra note 26. 
 107. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 880.6100, 880.6860 (2020) (providing performance 
standards for different ETO devices). 
456 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 21:2 
 
D. PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW REGULATIONS DIFFER BETWEEN 
FEDERAL STATUTES 
All three federal regulatory statutes discussed above have 
express preemption provisions.108 However, each statute 
handles preemption differently. The CAA has a very weak 
preemption clause that allows a great deal of leeway for state 
action.109 FIFRA has a strong but narrow preemption clause, 
preempting all state regulation of only a few types of 
requirements.110 And the FDCA has a very robust preemption 
clause, but one that is quite context-specific.111 
i. The CAA Preempts Only State Standards that Are Less 
Strict than Federal Law 
Environmental statutes such as the CAA are based upon 
“cooperative federalism[:]”112 uniform federal laws address a 
number of weaknesses in existing state law, while still providing 
a broad role for state action so as to avoid over-extension of 
federal power. Federal laws helped to minimize the risk of 
“spillover effects” where pollutants emitted in one state 
primarily affect another.113 Having one uniform standard also 
alleviated the risk of a “race to the bottom,” where in order to 
compete with one another for jobs, states eviscerated their 
environmental protections.114 However, environmental laws 
 
 108. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2018) (FIFRA); 21 U.S.C.§ 360k(a) (2018) (FDCA); 
42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2018) (CAA). 
 109. 42 U.S.C. § 7416. 
 110. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b); Bates v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 444 
(2005). 
 111. 21 U.S.C.§ 360k(a); cf. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 502 (1996) 
(holding that FDCA preemption applies only where the state law is a 
requirement on a specific device). 
 112. See, e.g., Jamie Gibbs Pleune, Do We Cair About Cooperative 
Federalism in the Clean Air Act?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 537, 540 (2006) (“The SIPs 
established a structure of cooperative federalism that reserved to the states the 
ability to meet the NAAQS according to their own policy choices”); Kim Ly, 
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences: Overcoming Federal Preemption and Giving the 
People a Voice, 29 J. OF THE NAT’L ASS’N OF ADMIN. L. JUDGES 297, 306 n.53 
(2006) (“FIFRA encourages cooperation between federal and state in regulating 
pesticides.”). 
 113. Pleune, supra note 112 at 549. 
 114. Douglas R. Williams, Cooperative Federalism and the Clean Air Act: A 
Defense of Minimum Federal Standards, 20 ST. LOUIS PUB. L. REV. 67, 108–110 
(2001); Douglas R. Williams, Toward Regional Governance in Environmental 
Law, 46 AKRON L. REV. 1047, 1074 (2013). 
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ultimately govern what uses of land are allowable, and 
“regulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by 
local governments.”115 Thus, environmental laws such as the 
CAA raise concerns over federal overreach. 
When passing the CAA, then, Congress designed the statute 
to preserve a central role for the states. The CAA is based on 
“cooperative Federal, State, regional, and local programs.”116 
States, not the federal government, still have the primary 
responsibility for ensuring compliance with CAA standards.117 
Under a system of cooperative federalism, states are given the 
first opportunity to regulate, as long as they at least meet the 
federal minimum standards.118 States may adopt or enforce “any 
standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants,” as 
long as they are not “less stringent” than the applicable federal 
standards.119 From a purely legal point of view, state 
crackdowns on an environmental pollutant are simply business 
as usual, and there is nothing the EPA can do to prevent such 
state laws coming into effect. However, the CAA does potentially 
alter the remedies available. The CAA has been held to preempt 
federal common law remedies,120 but the availability of state 
common law remedies for activities covered by the CAA remains 
uncertain.121 
ii. FIFRA Preempts Only State Law Labeling Requirements 
FIFRA takes a different approach to respecting state 
sovereignty than the CAA. Rather than set broad standards, 
with a broad allowance for state action, FIFRA preempts 
regulations of a narrow set of requirements. FIFRA strongly 
preempts states from enacting their own requirements in certain 
areas, such as labeling. The statute provides that a state “shall 
not impose . . . any requirements for labeling or packaging in 
 
 115. Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994). 
 116. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(4) (2018). 
 117. The CAA states that “air pollution prevention . . . and air pollution 
control at its source is the primary responsibility of the States and local 
governments.” Id. § 7401(a)(3); see also supra, Part I.C.i. 
 118. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1992) 
 119. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2018). 
 120. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011). 
 121. See generally Scott Gallisdorfer, Clean Air Act Preemption of State 
Common Law: Greenhouse Gas Nuisance Claims After AEP v. Connecticut, 99 
VA. L. REV. 131 (2013). 
458 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 21:2 
 
addition to or different from those required under” FIFRA.122 
However, states are expressly allowed to regulate the use or sale 
of pesticides that have been registered under FIFRA, as long as 
those laws do not impact the labeling of the pesticide.123 
Even under this seemingly strict preemption of state law in 
labeling, there may still be a role for state common law causes of 
action. Courts must engage in a fact-specific inquiry to 
determine whether state regulations genuinely impose 
requirements that are “in addition to” or “different from” those 
required under FIFRA.124 But if the state law requirements are 
the same as those under FIFRA, then parties may still be able 
to sue under, for example, state law failure-to-warn claims.125 
Courts disagree regarding what constitutes uniformity with 
federal statutes.126 
iii. The FDCA Strongly Preempts State Law Regulation of 
Medical Devices 
The FDCA expressly preempts any state law regulation of 
medical devices that “relate[] to the safety or effectiveness of the 
[medical] device,” or otherwise impose a requirement on the 
device.127 Courts have held that this language narrows the scope 
of federal preemption.128 Similarly to the requirements for 
FIFRA discussed above, state law requirements that are 
“different from, or in addition to” the federal requirements and 
“relate to safety and effectiveness” are preempted.129 However, 
“parallel claims”—state law damages for actions that are 
already violations of federal law—are not preempted.130 
 
 122. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (emphasis added). 
 123. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) & (b). 
 124. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U.S. 320, 444 (2005). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Compare Indian Brand Farms, Inc. v. Novartis Crop Protection Inc., 
617 F.3d 207, 221–25 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that failure to warn claims are 
generally not preempted by FIFRA), with In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn 
Litigation, 131 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1207–08 (D. Kan. 2015) (holding that failure 
to warn claims are preempted under FIFRA). 
 127. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). 
 128. See generally Lohr, 518 U.S. at 486, 489–90, 496–98 (discussing how 
terms like “requirements” and “relating to [] safety and effectiveness” narrow 
the scope of preemptable state law). 
 129. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 321–22 (2008). 
 130. Id. at 330; see also Bryant v. Medtronic, Inc., 623 F.3d 1200, 1205–07 
(8th Cir. 2010). 
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The Supreme Court also held that the FDCA does not 
preempt state law claims for devices that reach the market 
without undergoing a full FDA safety review.131 There are 
various pathways that would allow this to happen. The FDCA 
divides medical devices into three classes based on risk, with 
class I being low-risk devices and class III being high-risk.132 
Class III devices generally require a full pre-market review and 
FDA approval before they can be sold.133 However, class I devices 
generally do not undergo any premarket review, as they are low-
risk enough that they may be safely regulated with only general, 
post-market enforcement.134 Class II devices are between these 
two, and a popular pathway to market class II devices is the so-
called 510(k) process where a device is shown to be 
“substantially equivalent” to an already-approved device.135 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr dealt with a class II device, and held that 
such a finding of substantial equivalence did not constitute an 
FDA review of its safety; therefore product liability claims for 
class II devices were not preempted.136 
Some courts have also focused on whether the state law is a 
regulation of a specific medical device.137 The FDA has embraced 
this approach, promulgating regulations stating that state laws 
are preempted “only when the Food and Drug Administration 
has established specific counterpart regulations or there are 
other specific requirements applicable to a particular device 
under the act . . . .”138 The regulation also states that 
“requirements of general applicability,” such as “general electric 
codes” are not preempted.139 However, the Supreme Court has 
criticized this approach, stating that it “add[s] nothing to our 
analysis but confusion.”140 The Court focused on the “parallel 
claims” analysis,141 and courts since have generally found 
 
 131. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 493. 
 132. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2018). 
 133. Id. § 360e. 
 134. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(A). 
 135. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(B). 
 136. 518 U.S. at 493. 
 137. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 500; Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1372 
(11th Cir. 1999). 
 138. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d). 
 139. Id. § 808.1(d)(1). 
 140. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 329. 
 141. Id. at 330. 
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preemption even if the claim brought could also be brought 
against other types of consumer products.142 
Additionally, if states would like to promulgate their own 
medical device regulations, they can apply to the FDA for a 
waiver of federal preemption.143 The FDA will grant a waiver as 
long as the state requirement is more strict than otherwise 
applicable federal law, the state law does not conflict with 
federal law, and the state law is “required by compelling local 
conditions.”144 Once granted, the FDA may rescind the waiver 
upon making at least one of six possible factual findings.145 
These findings include a finding that new federal laws address 
the issue the state laws are aimed at, the “compelling local 
conditions” no longer exist, or that the state regulation is “no 
longer in the best interests of the public health.”146 
II. ANALYSIS 
Despite the goal of protecting the health of its citizens, 
Illinois’ laws restricting ETO could easily have the opposite 
effect by causing dangerous medical device shortages.147 
However, despite the potentially catastrophic effects on the 
public’s access to effective medical treatments, currently there is 
most likely nothing the federal government could do to 
intervene. Due to the balkanization of federal authority, no 
single agency has the power to weigh the positive health impacts 
of ETO sterilization against the negative health consequences of 
worker and bystander exposure to the chemical.148 
The CAA allows states to set their own environmental 
standards as long as they are at least as strict as the federal 
standards.149 FIFRA preempts only state labelling 
 
 142. See, e.g., Covert v. Stryker Corp., No. 1:08CV447, 2009 WL 2424559, at 
*5 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2009); Heisner v. Genzyme Corp., No. 08–C–593, 2009 WL 
1210633, at *2–*3 (N.D.Ill. Apr. 30, 2009); In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis 
Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 592 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1161 (D. Minn. 2009); Parker 
v. Stryker Corp., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1300–03 (D. Colo. 2008). 
 143. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(b). 
 144. Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 808.53–.101 (2019) (listing all state waivers 
currently in effect, including the District of Columbia). 
 145. 21 C.F.R. §§ 808.35(b)(1)–(6) (2019). 
 146. Id. 
 147. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
 148. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 149. 42 U.S.C. § 7416. 
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requirements, not regulations of the use of chemicals.150 While 
FDA regulations preempt all state regulations of medical devices 
absent an approved waiver,151 state environmental laws likely 
do not count as “requirements” for medical devices as they 
regulate only environmental release. It is therefore likely that 
no federal law preempts the new state-law controls on ETO. 
A. STATE REGULATION OF ETHYLENE OXIDE COULD LEAD TO 
CRITICAL MEDICAL SHORTAGES AND ENDANGER PUBLIC HEALTH 
The current state-level crackdown on the use of ETO has 
caused a great deal of alarm. The shutdown of the Willowbrook, 
Illinois facility discussed in the introduction section sent 
shockwaves throughout the medical industry. Attempts to 
further restrict the use of ETO for sterilization have not stopped 
with the Willowbrook shutdown. Recent state actions have also 
impacted the operations of at least four other sterilization 
facilities over concerns about the use of ETO.152 Medical 
professionals are increasingly concerned that state 
overregulation could cause major device shortages or endanger 
the stability of the medical supply chain.153 This instability could 
easily spread beyond just ETO, as well. Given the possible 
 
 150. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b). 
 151. 21 U.S.C.§ 360k(a). 
 152. Ben Brasch, State, Fulton Plant Make Deal to Reduce Ethylene Oxide 
Emissions, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Jan. 8, 2020), 
https://www.ajc.com/news/local/state-fulton-plant-make-deal-reduce-ethylene-
oxide-emissions/uOqcQ3tTc2MaeaFkWzstCN/; Maria Fontanazza, Another 
ETO Medical Device Sterilizer to Close Due to Environmental Quality Issues, 
MEDTECH INTELLIGENCE (Apr. 1, 2019), 
https://www.medtechintelligence.com/news_article/another-eto-medical-device-
sterilizer-to-close-due-to-environmental-quality-issues/; Brenda Goodman & 
Andy Miller, Metro Atlanta Sterilizing Plant Shutting Down as Air Tests Begin; 
Lawsuit Challenges EPD Deal, WABE (Sept. 9, 2019), 
https://www.wabe.org/metro-atlanta-sterilizing-plant-shutting-down-as-air-
tests-begin-lawsuit-challenges-epd-deal/; Conor Hale, Georgia Files Restraining 
Order Against BD Sterilization Plant over Ethylene Oxide Leak, FIERCE 
BIOTECH (Oct. 24, 2019 6:25am), 
https://www.fiercebiotech.com/medtech/georgia-files-restraining-order-against-
bd-sterilization-plant-over-ethylene-oxide-leak; Press Release, VIANT, 
https://tribwxmi.files.wordpress.com/2019/03/viant-letter-1.pdf (discussing the 
closure of sterilization operations at a Grand Rapids facility due to concerns 
surrounding air quality). 
 153. See, e.g., Fontanazza, supra note 152; David Lim, Ethylene Oxide Plant 
Closures Put US on ‘Cusp of a Major Medical Logistical Failure’, MEDTECH 
DIVE (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.medtechdive.com/news/ethylene-oxide-plant-
closures-place-united-states-on-cusp-major-medical-logistical-failure/566922/. 
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overreaction to fears of chemical toxicity, coupled with human 
irrationality in the face of uncertainty, these issues could reoccur 
with another vital chemical unless a permanent solution is 
found. 
The FDA has been following the issue closely, and issued a 
statement warning of potentially drastic medical device 
shortages.154 Numerous industry actors have also sounded the 
alarm, stating that the remaining sterilization facilities do not 
have the capacity to keep up with demand.155 Indeed, the closure 
of the Sterigenics Willowbrook facility has already caused 
shortages of some types of devices that used to be processed 
there.156 
Recent history has also shown the potential fragility of the 
medical supply chain in the United States. Puerto Rico 
manufactures approximately eight percent of the 
pharmaceuticals used in the United States, as well as huge 
numbers of medical devices.157 Hurricane Maria hit Puerto Rico 
in late 2017, causing widespread devastation across the 
 
 154. See Sharpless, supra note 14. 
 155. See, e.g., Lim, supra note 153; MedTech Intelligence Staff, What 
Industry Is Saying About Proposed Ethylene Oxide Sterilization Ban, MEDTECH 
INTELLIGENCE (Nov. 8, 2019), 
https://www.medtechintelligence.com/news_article/what-industry-is-saying-
about-proposed-ethylene-oxide-sterilization-ban/ (voicing concerns that 
closures could severely impact other sterilization facilities and would “send our 
healthcare supply chain into a tailspin . . . ”); ECRI Institute, ECRI Institute 
Opposes Proposed Ban of Ethylene Oxide (ETO) Sterilization Operations (Nov. 
7, 2019), https://www.ecri.org/press/ecri-institute-opposes-proposed-ban-
ethylene-oxide-sterilization (indicating that ECRI Institute, a non-profit 
patient safety organization, opposes a proposed ban on ETO sterilization 
operations because it “could result in widespread shortages of sterile medical 
devices”). 
 156. Jeffrey E. Shuren, Dir. CDRH Offices: Office of the Center Director, 
FDA, Statement From Jeff Shuren, M.D., Director of the Center for Devices and 
Radiological Health, on Agency Efforts to Mitigate Temporary Shortage of 
Pediatric Breathing Tubes Due to Recent Closure of Illinois Sterilization 
Facility (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-
announcements/statement-jeff-shuren-md-director-center-devices-and-
radiological-health-agency-efforts-mitigate. 
 157. Measured per dollar amount of product. See FDA, SECURING THE 
FUTURE FOR PUERTO RICO: RESTORING THE ISLAND’S ROBUST MEDICAL 
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island.158 Beyond just the effect of the storm on the island, 
however, the disruption of the medical manufacturing industry 
led to widespread shortages of critical medical supplies across 
the United States.159 Some of these shortages lasted for multiple 
years.160 And with over fifty percent of medical devices being 
sterilized with ETO,161 potential shortages from lack of 
sterilization capacity could be severe indeed. Past shortages 
have caused the price of scarce supplies to increase up to 
tenfold.162 This limits patient access and contributes to the 
already skyrocketing price of healthcare. 
Nor are such medical supply shortages merely business 
problems. Medical shortages have had a long history of 
adversely affecting patient care.163 While it is difficult to track 
exactly what causes a particular patient outcome, many experts 
have commented on the increased risk to patients caused by 
 
 158. Amanda Holpuch & Hazar Kilani, Hurricane Maria’s Lasting Impact 
on Puerto Rico’s Children Revealed in Report, GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/26/hurricane-maria-puerto-rico-
youth-mental-health-study-report (reporting on long-term effects of Hurricane 
Maria, including physical and mental health impacts); Frances Robles, Puerto 
Rican Government Acknowledges Hurricane Death Toll of 1,427, N. Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/09/us/puerto-rico-death-toll-
maria.html. 
 159. See, e.g., Katie Thomas & Sheila Kaplan, Hurricane Damage in Puerto 
Rico Leads to Fears of Drug Shortages Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/04/health/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-
pharmaceutical-manufacturers.html (describing the shortage of 
pharmaceuticals across the United States following a hurricane in Puerto Rico); 
Lauren Weber, Hurricane Maria’s Effect on the Health Care Industry Is 
Threatening Lives Across the U.S., HUFFPOST (Sept. 20, 2018, 5:45 am), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/iv-bag-drug-shortage-puerto-rico-hurricane-
maria_n_5ba1ca16e4b046313fc07a8b (describing the shortage of saline IV bags 
following the same hurricane). 
 160. David Lim, B. Braun Invests $1B in IV Fluid Manufacturing to 
Alleviate Shortages, MEDTECH DIVE (May 15, 2019), 
https://www.medtechdive.com/news/b-braun-invests-1b-in-iv-fluid-
manufacturing-to-alleviate-shortages/554855/ (reporting that even almost two 
years after Hurricane Maria, there are still shortages of IV bags). 
 161. GAMMA INDUSTRY PROCESSING ALLIANCE, supra note 13, at 9; OSHA, 
REGULATORY REVIEW OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMINISTRATION’S ETHYLENE OXIDE STANDARD at II-11, Mar. 2005. 
 162. See Weber, supra note 159 (describing an ambulance service that has 
“had to pay up to 10 times what it normally would for certain medication-
infused saline bags because of the short supply”) 
 163. Id. (providing one recent example in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria). 
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supply shortages.164 For example, the shortages caused by 
Hurricane Maria led to many medical providers having to 
change how they treated common injuries and illnesses, 
increasing health risks as patients received non-standard 
care.165 The practice of switching to different treatments itself 
went on to create further shortages of the supplies used in the 
second-best procedures.166 Other studies of medical shortages 
found evidence of severe rationing, where patients were unable 
to receive the treatments they needed.167 One study directly 
found that the shortage of a critical drug “was significantly 
associated with increased mortality among patients . . . .”168 
Past problems with inadequate sterilization have also led to 
fatal infections in patients receiving the substandard 
replacement devices.169 
The potential shortages caused by a lack of sterilization 
capacity could be further exacerbated by foibles of human 
psychology. People do not always behave rationally when 
 
 164. See Andrew Hantel et al., Prevalence and Severity of Rationing During 
Drug Shortages, 179 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 710, 710 (2019) (“Hospital 
medication shortages in the United States are associated with decreased quality 
and/or quantity of life.” (internal citations omitted)); C. Lee Ventola, The Drug 
Shortage Crisis in the United States, 36 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 740, 740 
(2011) (“[Drug shortages] adversely affect patient care by causing substitution 
of safe and effective therapies with alternative treatments; compromising or 
delaying medical procedures; or causing medication errors.”). 
 165. Weber, supra note 159 (explaining that due to the shortages of IV bags, 
hospitals and doctors had to deviate from standard medical practice). 
 166. Id. (“[T]he lack of IV bags led to ‘a large number of downriver 
shortages, . . . .’”) (quoting Erin Fox, senior director of the University of Utah’s 
drug information services); C. Lee Ventola, supra note 164, at 752 (“[T]he 
original shortage causes a decline in the supply of an alternative agent because 
of an unexpected increase in demand.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 167. See C. Lee Ventola, supra note 164, at 750–51. 
 168. Emily Vail et al., Association Between US Norepinephrine Shortage and 
Mortality Among Patients with Septic Shock, 317 JAMA 1433, 1434 (2017). 
 169. See Chad Terhune, Olympus Told Its U.S. Executives No Broad 
Warning About Tainted Medical Scopes Was Needed, Despite Superbug 
Outbreaks, L.A. TIMES (July 24, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
olympus-scopes-emails-20160721-snap-story.html (reporting that “at least 
[thirty-five] people at U.S. hospitals have died since 2013 . . . after suffering 
infections from contaminated gastrointestinal scopes . . . ”); FDA, Infections 
Associated with Reprocessed Duodenoscopes, https://www.fda.gov/medical-
devices/reprocessing-reusable-medical-devices/infections-associated-
reprocessed-duodenoscopes (last updated Aug. 29, 2019) (“[C]ases of [patient-
to-patient transmission of] infection were occurring despite confirmation that 
the users [of duodenoscopes] were following proper manufacturer cleaning and 
disinfection or sterilization instructions.”). 
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confronted with a crisis.170 Faced with uncertainty and 
shortages, organizations and individuals often decide to hoard 
resources and over-order supplies in order to create a 
stockpile.171 This stockpiling behavior creates a spike in demand 
of the scarce resource, contributing to, or even creating, the very 
problem that it was meant to alleviate. For example, the UK has 
experienced a number of consumer goods shortages, caused 
entirely by over-purchasing by consumers worried access might 
become limited due to Brexit.172 Coronavirus fears caused such 
widespread panic buying that many Australian supermarkets 
discussed limiting purchases of toilet paper—a product produced 
locally that is, according to many experts, at no risk of any 
shortages.173 There have even been a number of drug shortages 
caused by rumors of price increases, as hospitals try to stock up 
before the potential cost hike.174 This is a particularly likely 
scenario given the uncertainty stemming from the lack of 
uniform regulations at play with ETO. 
The controversy surrounding ETO may expand to include 
other chemicals, further endangering the American healthcare 
system. There have been several recent instances where 
commonly-used chemicals have, upon further study, been found 
to be potentially harmful.175 Some of these chemicals also 
 
 170. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic 
for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208–09 
(1973) (discussing the availability heuristic, which is a mental shortcut used in 
determining the likelihood of an event based on past experiences; events that 
one encounters frequently are viewed as more likely to reoccur than events one 
encounters infrequently, even if statistically the infrequent encounters occur 
more often). 
 171. C. Lee Ventola, supra note 164, at 749. 
 172. Tim Wallace, Panic Buying for Brexit Risks Causing the Very Shortages 
Stockpilers Fear, Warns OBR, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 19, 2019), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2019/03/19/panic-buying-risks-causing-
shortages-stockpilers-fear-warns/. 
 173. Frances Mao, Coronavirus Panic: Why Are People Stockpiling Toilet 
Paper?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-
51731422. 
 174. See C. Lee Ventola, supra note 164, at 749. 
 175. See, e.g., Julia Barrett, Hormone Impact: BPA Linked to Altered Gene 
Expression in Humans, 119 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 524 (2011) (BPA); Karen 
Duderstadt, Chemicals in Daily Life: Emerging Evidence on the Impact on Child 
Health, 26 J. OF PEDIATRIC HEALTH CARE 155 (2012) (BPA); Thit A. Mørck et 
al., PFAS Concentrations in Plasma Samples from Danish School Children and 
Their Mothers, 129 CHEMOSPHERE 203 (2015) (PFAS). 
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engendered a high degree of public scrutiny.176 While many of 
these chemicals pose a genuine public health danger, public 
reaction has verged on frenzy instead of measured and 
constructive dialog. One article discussing BPA, a chemical 
previously used in some plastics that had been linked to 
potential reproductive issues, used the lurid title “BPA Wrecks 
Sex, Fouls Food—and Worse” in an attempt to capture attention 
and internet traffic.177 There is now an entire scientific literature 
dealing with “chemophobia”—the overreaction to risks 
associated with anything described as a “chemical.”178 
This propensity to overreaction, coupled with the inherent 
toxicity of chemical sterilants, leaves the American medical 
industry vulnerable. The medical system needs the ability to 
sterilize devices which cannot withstand high temperatures or 
prolonged exposure to radiation. Yet any chemical that could 
replace ETO would itself need to be toxic enough to destroy 
bacteria—and therefore would very likely cause many of the 
same side effects, and inspire similar levels of opposition, as 
ETO itself. A more thoughtful regulatory response is therefore 
required to prevent serious shortages of lifesaving materials. 
B. UNDER CURRENT LAW, STATE LAW REGULATIONS OF ETO 
ARE LIKELY NOT PREEMPTED 
By dividing regulatory authority over ETO into separate 
contexts, Congress unwittingly prevented any single agency 
from being able to consider the ultimate issue at stake: whether 
the benefits to the public health outweigh the harms caused by 
ETO use. Current environmental laws such as the CAA are 
based upon assessments of the health impact only from the 
 
 176. See, e.g., Paula Gardner, Michigan Sues 17 Chemical Companies for 
PFAS Contamination, MLIVE (Jan. 14, 2020), 
https://www.mlive.com/news/2020/01/michigan-sues-17-chemical-companies-
for-pfas-contamination.html; Michael Hawthorne & Dan Mihalopoulos, 
Chicago Sends a Message on BPA, CHI. TRIB. (May 14, 2009), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2009-05-14-0905131100-
story.html. 
 177. Elaine Shannon, BPA Wrecks Sex, Fouls Food—and Worse, ENVTL. 
WORKING GROUP (Nov. 11, 2009), https://www.ewg.org/kid-safe-chemicals-act-
blog/2009/11/bpa-ruins-sex-pollutes-food-and-probably-worse/. 
 178. See, e.g., Susan Billington et al., Covert Approaches to Countering Adult 
Chemophobia, 85 J. CHEMICAL EDUC. 379 (2008); Michelle Francl, How to 
Counteract Chemophobia, 5 NATURE CHEMISTRY 439 (2013); Gordon Gribble, 
Food Chemistry and Chemophobia, 5 FOOD SECURITY 177 (2013). 
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release of the pollutant, excluding any consideration of what the 
chemical is used for.179 Based on this narrow analytical 
foundation, states are given authority to regulate more 
strictly.180 The architects of the CAA assumed that stricter 
regulations would lead to better health outcomes, and states are 
granted the authority to choose to adopt more costly measures, 
if they wish.181 Medical device regulations, on the other hand 
grant the states far less authority to set their own regulations.182 
However, while the FDA can set minimum standards for 
compounds all the way up the supply chain, it does not have the 
power to assure that a given compound remains available. There 
is therefore most likely no formal action that a federal agency 
could take to prevent the state-level banning of ETO. 
i. State Regulations of ETO Are Likely Not Preempted by EPA 
Authority 
The CAA is very clear: states can pass their own emission 
limits as long as they are more stringent than their federal 
equivalents.183 FIFRA is equally clear: state regulations of the 
use of pesticides are not preempted.184 States are only forbidden 
from passing laws altering the requirements for pesticide 
labels.185 State laws banning the use of ETO are more strict than 
current federal laws, thus evading CAA preemption. And state 
laws ban only the use, and do not add any requirements for the 
labeling, thus evading FIFRA preemption. Therefore, neither 
the CAA nor FIFRA preempt state law bans on the use of ETO. 
ii. State Environmental Laws Are Likely Not Specific Enough 
to Devices to Be Preempted Under the FDCA. 
The FDCA contains a much stronger preemption clause 
than those in the CAA and FIFRA.186 However, that preemption 
has been interpreted relatively narrowly, with courts generally 
reading it as only applying to laws that directly affect the safety 
 
 179. See Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 858 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 
 180. 42 U.S.C. § 7416. 
 181. Id. 
 182. 21 U.S.C.§ 360k(a). 
 183. 42 U.S.C. § 7416. 
 184. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) & (b). 
 185. Id. § 136v(b). 
 186. 21 U.S.C. § 360k. 
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or effectiveness of the device.187 State environmental regulations 
are therefore likely not specific enough to any given device to 
constitute a “requirement” for the device. The FDCA therefore 
likely does not preempt such attenuated, indirect effects. 
The FDCA does not envision as broad a role for state policies 
as environmental statutes generally do. It preempts all state law 
requirements for medical devices—regardless of whether they 
are stricter than federal law.188 However, the federalism and 
state sovereignty concerns motivating the design of 
environmental law are still present with device regulations.189 
Courts have therefore narrowed the interpretation of the 
FDCA’s preemption provisions.190 
A partly analogous context may be found in the realm of 
product liability cases. Where a consumer brings a product 
liability case against a medical device manufacturer, the 
manufacturer often raises preemption as a defense.191 The 
argument is that because the FDA has certified the device as 
safe, state law cannot hold that the device unreasonably caused 
injury—i.e. was unsafe.192 Where the product at issue has been 
subject to FDA review for safety, courts have found in favor of 
preemption.193 
Applying this reasoning to the context of environmental 
regulations directed at ETO, however, leads to difficulties. First, 
preemption under this reasoning would apply only where the 
FDA has actually reviewed the device in question; class I and 
class II devices may not be covered.194 Even assuming that every 
affected facility will process at least some class III devices, 
 
 187. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486, 489–90, 496–98 (1996) 
(discussing how terms like “requirements” and “relating to [] safety and 
effectiveness” narrow the scope of preemptable state law). 
 188. Id. 
 189. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 475 (discussing the broad police powers states 
have to protect the health and safety of its citizens) (citing Hillsborough County 
v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985); Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985)). 
 190. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 493–94 (holding that “[FDCA’s § 510(k) “substantial 
equivalency”] process is focused on equivalence, not safety”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 191. See, e.g., id. 
 192. Id.; Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323 (2008). 
 193. See, e.g., Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330. 
 194. Cf. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 493 (holding that common law claims regarding a 
class II device are not preempted because there was no actual FDA review of 
safety for that specific device). 
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however, the analogy still does not hold. For a class III device, 
the thing that is reviewed by the FDA is the final, commercially 
sold device, not the sterilants used in its manufacture.195 More 
directly, while a product liability claim directly contradicts the 
FDA certification that the device is safe, an environmental 
regulation raises no such issue. A product liability claim (“Device 
A is unsafe”) is directly incompatible with the federal law 
(“Device A is safe”). However, a law deeming a specific device 
safe does not contradict a law preventing the release of a 
chemical used in manufacturing that device. A necessary 
consequence of banning that release could be that the chemical 
is unavailable for use in manufacturing. But the law banning the 
release can hardly be said to be a “requirement” on the device. 
That the FDCA likely does not preempt state environmental 
regulation is further reinforced by the language of the FDCA. 
State lawmakers are forbidden from creating requirements 
different from those “applicable under this chapter [of the 
FDCA].”196 An environmental law requirement could impact the 
safety of a device and therefore be construed as applicable under 
the FDCA. However, including the language preempting state 
requirements that differs from those “applicable under this 
chapter [of the FDCA]” shows that the FDCA preempts only 
more direct requirements relating to medical devices rather than 
indirect impacts from unrelated environmental legislation. 
Since a state law banning the release of ETO is most likely not 
a “requirement” of the manufacture of any particular medical 
device, it would most likely not be preempted by the FDCA. 
C. FEDERAL AGENCIES SHOULD HAVE A WAY TO OVERSEE 
REGULATION OF NECESSARY HEALTHCARE CHEMICALS LIKE 
ETHYLENE OXIDE 
States have a strong and legitimate interest in regulating 
the quality of their environments. However, sometimes actions 
that protect the public health implicate other important health 
programs. The use of harsh chemicals to prepare safe medical 
devices may have a negative impact on public health,197 but that 
impact may be far outweighed by the need for sterile products. 
 
 195. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360c(C) (referring to “a device” as a whole, not the 
specific contents used in the manufacture such device). 
 196. Id. § 360k(a)(1). 
 197. Recall that ETO has been deemed a “human carcinogen.” EPA 2016, 
supra note 1. 
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To prevent a situation where every state actor chases purely 
local goals at the expense of nationwide public health, the 
federal government should have a role to ensure national values 
are represented. 
One way to look at the problem of ETO sterilization is 
through the lens of NIMBY (“not in my backyard”), a sort of 
inverse tragedy of the commons.198 In a NIMBY199 situation, 
where there is widespread agreement on the importance of a 
particular endeavor, and each actor agrees that it needs to be 
done somewhere, but each actor wants it to be done somewhere 
else.200 When a multitude of different local actors regulate ETO, 
each locality has an incentive to strenuously resist the operation 
of any sterilization facilities, acting under the belief that some 
other locality will allow it. A uniform federal system of 
regulations could help to solve this problem, as a national 
perspective eliminates the possibility that someone else will do 
it. A facility being operated anywhere in the United States would 
be subject to the same rules. 
Additionally, a uniform regulatory system may alleviate 
some causes of the NIMBY reaction. Some academics suggest 
that the true cause of the depth of NIMBY feeling is concerns of 
fairness.201 “The aim of NIMBY activists and actors can be seen 
as not only protesting against planning processes, 
but . . . ensuring the legitimacy and acceptability of land-use 
 
 198. A tragedy of the commons is where every person agrees there should be 
limits on the use of a resource, but are individually better off by not following 
any limits, leading to the over-exploitation of the resource to the point of 
destruction. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 
(1968) (offering various illustrations of the concept). 
 199. NIMBY has also been referred to as LULU (“locally unwanted land 
uses”), NIABY (“not in anyone’s backyard”), NIMTOO (“not in my term of 
office”), BANANA (“build absolutely nothing anywhere near anyone”), NOPE 
(“not on planet earth”), and CAVE (“citizens against virtually everything”). 
Carissa Schively, Understanding the NIMBY and LULU Phenomena: 
Reassessing Our Knowledge Base and Informing Future Research, 21 J. PLAN. 
LITERATURE 255 (2007). 
 200. Patrick Devine-Wright, Explaining “NIMBY” Objections to a Power 
Line: The Role of Personal, Place Attachment and Project-Related Factors, 45 
ENV. & BEHAV. 761, 763–65 (2012); Renée J. Johnson & Michael J. Scicchitano, 
Don’t Call Me NIMBY: Public Attitudes Toward Solid Waste Facilities, 44 ENV. 
& BEHAV. 410, 410–12 (2012). 
 201. Veikko Eranti, Re-Visiting NIMBY: From Conflicting Interests to 
Conflicting Valuations, 65 SOC. REV. 285, 286 (2017); Maarten Wolsink, Invalid 
Theory Impedes Our Understanding: A Critique on the Persistence of the 
Language of NIMBY, 31 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 85 (2006). 
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decisions on a larger scale.”202 A federal regulatory scheme 
attuned to the actual issue, namely whether the overall health 
benefit of ETO use outweighs the hazards of that use, could help 
alleviate these concerns. Strong federal controls of ETO use 
would ensure that any continuing use of ETO would reflect the 
considered expert judgment of a specialized agency. Further, if 
local residents become concerned and wish to gain a more 
thorough understanding of ETO regulation, a single federal 
standard would be much easier to find and understand than an 
overlapping collage of local, state, and federal laws and 
regulations. 
D. AMENDING THE CAA TO INCLUDE FDA-LIKE PREEMPTION 
ALLOWS STATE FLEXIBILITY AND WOULD PREVENT SHORTAGES 
OF MEDICAL DEVICES 
Federal agencies should play a greater role in the uniform 
regulation of ETO. Such a change could take many forms. One 
promising possibility is a preemption waiver system based on 
the existing medical device laws. An FDA-style preemption 
system, where states can apply for a waiver of federal 
preemption, could balance the interests of state autonomy 
versus federal uniformity.203 A waiver system would allow for 
state flexibility in setting their own laws, while still allowing the 
federal government to intervene if it determined that local 
efforts would ultimately cause more harm than good. Lastly, 
granting this role to the EPA would make the most sense, 
because the EPA is already involved in CAA rulemaking. 
Under the current FDCA waiver system, a state may obtain 
a waiver as long as the proposed state requirement is stricter 
than applicable federal standards, the state law does not directly 
conflict with federal law, and the state law is “required by 
compelling local conditions.”204 Ordinarily, an environmental 
law passed to ensure the safety of the local populace is certainly 
 
 202. Eranti, supra note 201, at 287. 
 203. The current waiver system does already apply to ETO—to the extent 
that state laws are currently preempted by the FDCA. As state environmental 
laws are most likely not preempted under the FDCA, see supra Section I.D.iii, 
statutory change will be necessary to include these types of laws under any 
potential preemption waiver scheme. 
 204. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(b); see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 808.53–.101 (2019) (listing all 
state waivers currently in effect). 
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“compelling.”205 Under this system, preemption waivers could be 
given freely, leaving the state’s inherent powers to protect its 
population mostly intact. 
The current FDA waiver system allows a revocation of a 
granted waiver if the agency makes at least one of several 
specified findings.206 Specifically, the FDA can revoke a granted 
preemption waiver upon a finding that the state law is “no longer 
in the best interests of the public health.”207 Importing this 
language to a preemption system under the CAA for chemical 
sterilants such as ETO would grant the federal government a 
mechanism by which it could intervene to prevent critical 
shortages of medical products. It would also prevent too much 
federal intrusion into state policymaking. After all, a mere 
increase in price would not affect the public health, so increased 
regulatory burden alone would not be enough to trigger a 
revocation of the state preemption waiver.208 As long as a state 
law did not threaten medical device shortages—if, for example, 
it were phased in over a long enough period of time that the 
supply chain could adapt and ensure uninterrupted 
production—states would be free to make whatever local law 
choices they desired. 
Granting this authority to the EPA would make the most 
sense. The state laws that are causing these issues are 
environmental statutes, an area of the EPA’s expertise.209 
Unlike the FDA, the EPA is already involved in CAA 
rulemaking. Taking the time to better understand states’ 
proposals would therefore be less of a burden. Indeed, due to the 
existing CAA preemption provisions,210 the EPA is likely already 
well-informed about state environmental laws. 
 
 205. Cf. Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. City of League City, Tex., 488 F.3d 
613, 622 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that public safety is “a compelling interest at 
the heart of government’s function”). 
 206. 21 C.F.R. § 808.35(b) (2019). 
 207. Id. § 808.35(b)(6). 
 208. Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. 457, 466 (2001) (holding that 
absent express authorization, agencies may not consider cost in determining if 
a proposed regulation advances the public health). 
 209. Our Mission and What We Do, EPA (Feb. 7, 2018), 
https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do (noting that the 
EPA works to ensure that federal laws protecting the environment are 
administered and enforced fairly). 
 210. See discussion supra Section I part D(i). 
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The EPA already has a long and successful history of risk-
risk balancing, like the considerations at issue here between 
environmental, health, and safety concerns. For example, the 
Safe Drinking Water Act requires the EPA to set standards for 
chemical contaminants in drinking water. The EPA first sets a 
goal at “the level at which no known or anticipated adverse 
effects on the health of persons occur,”211 then sets an 
enforceable limit at the level “as close to the maximum 
contaminant level goal as is feasible.”212 However, the 
enforceable level may be altered if needed to ensure the best 
overall drinking water quality—such as if treating a given 
contaminant will create more contaminants or interfere with 
other steps in water treatment.213 The chlorine that is used to 
kill microorganisms in drinking water does leave behind 
carcinogenic by-products.214 However, the reduction in mortality 
from waterborne diseases associated with chlorinating water 
vastly outweighs this risk, so the United States continues to 
chlorinate our drinking water—and we are overall much 
healthier for it.215 
Granting the EPA a general power of preemption in 
regulating ETO (and other harmful but seemingly necessary 
chemicals), coupled with a freely-granted waiver option, would 
enable protection of the public health with minimal disruption 
of state autonomy. States would generally remain free to act 
however they think best. However, state action would be subject 
to federal oversight that could intervene if—but only if—state 
action caused a direct threat to the health of the nation.216 
 
 211. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4)(A) (2018). 
 212. Id. § 300g-1(b)(4)(B). 
 213. Id. § 300g-1(b)(5)(A). 
 214. Ahmed Mahmoud El-Tawil, Colorectal Cancers and Chlorinated Water, 
8 WORLD J. GASTROINTESTINAL ONCOLOGY 402 (2016). 
 215. AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N, WATER CHLORINATION/CHLORAMINATION 
PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES 2–6 (2d ed. 2006). 
 216. It is also important to distinguish a number of conclusions that this 
Note does not draw. First, this Note does not discuss whether the law should be 
changed, and federal regulatory power enlarged, because state law actions may 
make sterilizing medical devices more expensive. These kinds of local 
cost/benefit calculations are exactly why federal statutes such as the CAA allow 
states to enact their own rules, a topic which has been thoroughly debated 
elsewhere. Rather, the concern addressed here is the direct health impact that 
a shortage of sterile products would cause. Second, this Note does not suggest 
what the outcome of further study of ETO sterilization would be. It is entirely 
plausible that the harm to workers and communities from the release of ETO 
474 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 21:2 
 
E. COMPREHENSIVE STATUTORY REFORM IS A BETTER SOLUTION 
THAN OFFSHORING THE PRODUCTION OF STERILIZED MEDICAL 
DEVICES 
Enormous amounts of medical manufacturing is already 
done overseas. India currently supplies approximately half of 
the world’s vaccines, and produces around forty percent of all 
generic drugs consumed in the U.S.217 China meanwhile 
produces around thirty percent of the U.S. market for medical 
devices218 and ninety-seven percent of the antibiotics used in the 
U.S.219 All told, approximately eighty percent of all active 
pharmaceutical ingredients used in the U.S. are manufactured 
abroad.220 Given these existing trends within the medical 
manufacturing industry, it seems likely that if the United States 
cannot adequately address how companies can continue to 
sterilize medical devices domestically, the result will be that 
these functions will be sent offshore. However, exporting these 
capabilities in order to avoid U.S. environmental laws raises 
serious issues in regard to both ethics and the stability of the 
U.S. public health supply chain. 
Simply offshoring the capabilities to countries with less 
strict environmental regulation raises profound concerns of 
environmental justice.221 If we think ETO is too dangerous to 
 
could outweigh the benefits of its use to consumers of sterilized goods. A 
potential device shortage could, in theory, adversely affect the health of fewer 
people than the continued operation of ETO sterilization facilities. The problem 
is not that some analysis has found the use of ETO to be unjustified. The 
problem is that, under the current legal structure, no regulator is doing this 
analysis. 
 217. Charlotte Edwards, Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Companies in 
India: Ones to Watch, PHARMACEUTICAL TECH. (Aug. 6, 2018), 
https://www.pharmaceutical-technology.com/features/pharmaceutical-
manufacturing-companies-in-india/. 
 218. Mihir Torsekar, Pain in the (Supply) Chain: Tariffs and U.S.-China 
Medtech Trade, MED. PRODUCTS OUTSOURCING (Apr. 3, 2019), 
https://www.mpo-mag.com/issues/2019-04-01/view_columns/pain-in-the-
supply-chain-tariffs-and-us-china-medtech-trade/. 
 219. Yanzhong Huang, U.S. Dependence on Pharmaceutical Products from 
China, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Aug.14, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-
dependence-pharmaceutical-products-china. 
 220. Id. 
 221. “Environmental Justice” has been described as “the fair treatment and 
meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, 
or income, with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement 
of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.” Environmental Justice, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice (last visited Mar. 8, 2020). 
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work within our communities, why would it be better to ship it 
off to have someone else, in a poorer and less-developed nation, 
do the same work? Environmental justice advocates have long 
raised arguments that the placement of heavily polluting 
facilities within poorer communities, often disproportionately 
populated by people of color, constitutes “environmental 
racism.”222 Especially given the relative ease with which ETO 
emissions can be controlled,223 it may be that the most ethical 
course of action would be to ensure that sterilization facilities 
are kept in the U.S., where they can be subject to more thorough 
oversight. 
The globalization of the medical supply chain can also have 
the unintended consequence of making the public health more 
vulnerable to disruptive events. The recent coronavirus 
outbreak has shown that public health emergencies can leave 
countries without their own production facilities in extremely 
precarious situations. As COVID-19 spreads, many countries, 
including China and India, have limited or banned the export of 
certain medical products.224 Such bans threaten to create further 
shortages—including shortages of products not directly related 
to the emergency, such as the common painkiller paracetamol.225 
Future disruptions could come from any range of natural 
disasters. An earthquake or wildfire is tragedy enough when it 
occurs; concentrating such a vital industry as medical 
manufacturing in fewer places by offshoring much of the 
capability invites secondary tragedies as people perhaps 
thousands of miles from the initial disaster are left without 
 
 222. Renee Skelton & Vernice Miller, The Environmental Justice Movement, 
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 223. CR CLEAN AIR GROUP, supra note 31. 
 224. See, e.g., Hannah Ellis-Petersen, India Limits Medicine Exports After 
Supplies Hit by Coronavirus, GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2020), 
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(Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Coronavirus—China-drugs-
export-ban-sees-costs-shoot-up/1056-5478720-14kxl64/index.html (China); 
Associated Press, EU Seeks United Front to Tackle Medical Shortages from 
Virus, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2020), 
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outbreak-europe.html (Germany, Czech Republic). 
 225. Coronavirus: Drug Shortage Fears as India Limits Exports, BBC NEWS 
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necessary medical products. It will therefore be advantageous 
for the U.S. to develop a long-term solution to the problem, that 
increases the odds of sterilization continuing domestically. 
CONCLUSION 
 While undertaken in an attempt to protect the local 
population from harm, a number of state actions tightening 
regulations on ETO could end up having exactly the opposite 
effect. ETO is the most commonly used chemical for sterilizing 
medical devices—and currently has no viable replacement.226 A 
sudden ban of the use of ETO could cause dangerous shortages 
of necessary healthcare materials. Rather than protect the 
public, the states’ knee-jerk reaction banning the use of ETO 
could end up costing lives. Because of the balkanization of 
federal regulatory power, no single agency can consider both the 
environmental costs and the healthcare needs associated with 
ETO use. This leaves the federal government without any formal 
abilities to prevent this potential crisis. 
In order to prevent state actions from damaging the supply 
of life-saving medical devices, environmental statutes including 
the CAA should be amended to more strongly preempt state 
actions. Concurrently, states should be given the ability to apply 
for a waiver of that preemption, which should be freely granted 
unless the state action threatens the public health. Federal 
regulation bypasses a number of issues associated with local 
control.227 A system where states apply for preemption waivers 
that are freely given, but may be retracted, provides a balance of 
state and federal interests. States’ powers to set local policy will 
remain generally undisturbed, yet federal oversight will prevent 
a multitude of local self-interests from creating a national crisis. 
 
 226. See Sharpless, supra note 14. 
 227. See supra Section II.C. 
